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Abstract 
`Climategate’ refers to the emails hacked from the University of East Anglia’s Climate 
Research Unit at the end of 2009.  What was found in those email caused shock headlines 
in the mass media and glee on the part of global warming’s critics.  But nothing unusual 
was happening; this is the normal to-and-fro of science that is normally invisible – it is 
‘tidied away’ by the time the research papers are published.  The moral is that we have to 
take great care about how we interpret what we read, always bearing in mind the purpose 
and audience for which it was written. 
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`Climategate’ refers to the emails hacked from the University of East Anglia’s Climate 
Research Unit at the end of 2009.  Suddenly we were all given a glimpse of the normally 
hidden day-to-day working of disputed science.  There was some unforgiveable slop but 
to the sociologist of science there was nothing shocking about it – it’s just business as 
usual.  In spite of the mythology, science cannot get by without humans judging other 
humans.  Experiments and observations are open to too many interpretations to speak for 
themselves.  Seeing that judgement exercised can come as a shock if, like most people, 
you’ve been brought up on the myth of Newton and Einstein and all the rest – the flashes 
of genius and point experiments that that reveal unquestionable truth.  We hear: `In 1997 
the Michelson-Morley experiment proved decisively that the speed of light-speed was a 
constant, a result explained by the genius Einstein only 20 years later.’  We don’t hear 
that in 1925 D. C. Miller was awarded the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science’s Physics Prize for proving that the speed was not a constant but was largely 
ignored or falsely explained away?  Physicists had to make the judgement!  (See Collins 
and Pinch, 1993/1998 for an account of the Michelson-Morley experiment on the speed 
of  light.)   
One of the most pervasive responses to Climategate is to try to make the science of 
climate change a more public activity.  Thus Mike Hulme, professor of climate change in 
the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia, and Jerry Ravetz, 
a scientist turned social commentator and philosopher of science, insist that scientists 
must `Show their Working’.  They write:  T`o be validated, knowledge must also be 
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subject to the scrutiny of an extended community of citizens who have legitimate stakes 
in the significance of what is being claimed … in the new century of digital 
communication and an active citizenry, the very practices of scientific enquiry must also 
be publicly owned.’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8388485.stm).  In this, Hume and Miller 
are echoing a glib, `one size fits all’, contemporary fashion in social studies of science – 
`sort out all problems of visible scientific disagreement by opening things up to the 
public’.  That this supposed resolution has not been thought through is obvious as soon as 
you say `MMR’ or, for that matter, `reintroduction of capital punishment in the UK’.   
A considered solution to the problem of public science and technology disputes has to be 
start with the `the target diagram’.  In the middle of any scientific dispute is a `core-set’ 
of specialists – these are the people who actually do the experiments, build the theories, 
and meet together to argue at conferences.  In the early days of a debate over something 
like gravitational wave detection the number of 
scientists in the core-set was little more than 
half-a-dozen whereas what they did was being 
reported to and discussed in the outer rings by 
hundreds of their fellow scientists, by funders 
and policy-makers, by journalists and, to some 
extent, the public at large.  The key insight is 
that what happens inside the core-set is hugely complicated.  In the early 1970s every 
waking moment of the scientists locked in dispute about whether gravitational waves had 
actually been detected was filled with calculations, arguments, measurements, judgments 
  
4
of other’s capabilities, and so on.  How could it be otherwise?  ClimateGate is just a 
glimpse behind the scenes of a small part of the blooming, buzzing hive of activity – after 
all, it is only a few emails.  (For the notion of ‘core-set’ see Collins, 1985/1992) 
What it means to be a `specialist’ is to be in there with all those 24-hour-a-day goings on.  
To be a non-specialist is not to be in there.  If you are outside things inevitably become 
simplified – the bandwidth is too narrow to carry all the nuanced information about what 
is happening inside and it would be a full-time occupation to absorb it.  What happens is 
that `distance lends enchantment’.  What is nuanced and unclear to those inside the core-
set becomes sharp and clear to those outside it.  Knowledge roughly follows a `direct 
square law’ – as it travels further it gets rapidly stronger because all the uncertainties get 
lost.  So people outside the core are much more certain of things than people inside – 
sometimes they may be more certain in a positive way but where there is disagreement 
(the shaded segment) there will be much more certainty about the counter view too.  
Now, we know from ClimateGate, and from decades of careful examination of scientific 
practice by social scientists, that the difference between the inside and the outside is not 
what we once thought it was.  We know that scientists’ activities inside the core-set look 
pretty ordinary in many respects.  For these reasons we know that we can never go back 
to the 1950s where the pronouncement of any scientist in a white coat was taken to be 
authoritative, not only on the science, but also on any policy-related issue.  We know that 
pronouncements on even the science are no longer authoritative and that democratic 
politics always trumps scientific conclusions.  We know that it is better that people know 
more about the processes of science and understand how this conclusion or that will 
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affect their lives and that they should be able to choose the science they want.  
Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that the inside and outside of science are different 
in two important ways.  First, as explained, there is all that detail and nuance that cannot 
get out, and second there is a different style of argument within the core because of the 
detail and nuance and the plain old value system of science.   
The value system of science is often honoured in the breach but it still underpins its 
distinctiveness.  Very roughly, it means that, mostly, inside the core, you are trying to get 
to the collective truth of the matter and this means you start by trying to understand and 
fairly represent your opponent’s position.  You have to do this if you want to convince 
your opponent as well as yourself.   And you have some, often forlorn, grounds to hope 
that you can convince your opponent with argument starting from his or her position 
because you both know about the nuances and the doubts.  Outside there is no such hope 
because no-one knows enough of the nuances and doubts so disagreements turn into 
`campaigns’ rather than debate.  This seems a subtle distinction but it is quite robust: 
scientists immediately know when their opponents have ceased to play by the rules and 
instead of taking their opponents’ arguments seriously are ignoring them or caricaturing 
them and `playing to the audience’.  At that point the scientist is directing argument, not 
at the core, but outside toward the public.  This is `science war’ not science debate.   
If one wants to preserve the thing called `science’ as a distinctive way of making 
knowledge one cannot mix the inside too thoroughly with the outside.  The `bring the 
public into scientific decision-making’ movement is a very good thing, and we can never 
go back, and should ne ver try to go back.  But if things go too far there won’t be any 
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science, there will only be technological populism.  In the last resort, there are 
specialists and there is a special scientific way of going about decision-making – it is 
different to `science war’.  To deny that is to licence scientists to forget it themselves and 
start to campaign like the rest of us.  (For discussions of the dangers of ‘technological 
populism’ and the reconstruction of the notion of expertise, see Collins and Evans 2002; 
2007) 
What ClimateGate has shown, apart from some bits of unfortunate sloppy practice, is that 
the IPCC reports have been mixing the outside with the inside too much.  If the IPCC 
reports had reported solely what went on inside science, there would be more reservations 
and nuances – the reports would be less useful to politicians.  The final political editing 
stage was what turned them from science to campaign material.  
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